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SYMPOSIUM ON ANTITRUST AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: FEDERAL
ANTITRUST AGENCIES AND PUBLIC POLICY
TOWARD ANTITRUST AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
B. Zorina Khan t
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the exclusive fights of intellectual prop-
erty owners and monopoly power has generated a longstanding debate.
In England, the 1624 Statute of Monopolies prohibited monopolies, but
granted an exemption for "patent monopolies," which were nevertheless
closely monitored and strictly construed. The United States chose to
abandon English precedent and created the world's first modem patent
system. U.S. Federal and State courts shaped industrial policy in the
antebellum period and celebrated intellectual property fights as "some of
the dearest and most valuable fights which society acknowledges, and
the Constitution itself means to favor."' Numerous decisions addressed
the issue of the appropriate boundaries of property rights in patents, and
attempted to balance those rights with a perceived need to promote com-
petition and economic growth. More than forty years before the passage
of the Sherman Act, the courts proposed that "the rights of inventive
genius, and the valuable property produced by it, all persons in the exer-
cise of this spirit will be willing to vindicate and uphold ... but those
rights on the other hand, should be maintained in a manner not harsh to
other inventors, nor unaccommodating to the growing wants of the
community."'2
t Department of Economics, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, ME 04011, bkhan@bow-
doin.edu, (207) 725-3841. This paper is part of an extensive project on antitrust and intellec-
tual property. I benefited from comments and discussions with Bob Cull, Christopher Kelly,
Erica Mintzer, Carl Shapiro, Howard Shelanski, Kenneth Sokoloff, Willard Tom, Dan Wall, as
well as the participants and organizers of the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy Sym-
posium on Antitrust and Intellectual Property, the NBER/Sloan Conference on the Patent Sys-
tem and Innovation, and the All-UC Conference on R&D and Economic Growth. Eileen
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1 Ex Parte Wood and Brundage, 22 U.S. 603, 608 (1824).
2 Woodworth v. Edwards, 30 F. Cas. 567 (C.C.D. Me. 1847) (No. 18,014). See also
Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 329 (21 How. 322, 329) (1859) ('Whilst the remuneration of
genius and useful ingenuity is a duty incumbent upon the public, the rights and welfare of the
community must be fairly dealt with and effectually guarded.")
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Judicial oversight of industrial policy was based on what Morton
Horwitz termed "instrumentalism," or the use of legal decisions to pro-
mote economic growth. 3 Early American common law includes an im-
pressive stock of market-oriented decisions that still inform public policy
today. These decisions made important contributions to the technologi-
cal and economic progress that ultimately led to the emergence of the
United States as the pre-eminent industrial nation by the end of the nine-
teenth century. However, there was widespread concern that market ex-
pansion favored the rise of giant corporations whose owners wielded
significant power. Some have suggested that populist support for legisla-
tion to restrain these monopolies resulted in the passage of the Sherman
Act in 1890, and later the Federal Trade Commission Act and Clayton
Act of 1914.
Today diverse influences shape United States industrial policy.
These influences include federal and state courts, private litigation, vari-
ous regulatory agencies, and the federal antitrust agencies. A volumi-
nous literature addresses institutional features of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ). Economists and lawyers have scrutinized the case history
associated with policies toward business. Several reports have assessed
the antitrust agencies in terms of their organizational structure, adminis-
trative efficiency, and allocation of resources. Others have debated the
wisdom of dual antitrust enforcement. This paper examines the relation-
ship between antitrust litigation and intellectual property, and compares
the enforcement of antitrust regulations by the FTC and the Antitrust
Division of the DOJ.
Legal analysts tend to focus on intensive studies of a few cases that
are instructive in some specific dimension. Recently, for instance, their
attention has been directed to antitrust cases that involve the intellectual
property rights of large dominant corporations such as Microsoft and In-
tel. Such studies are informative and useful, if only because of the size
of these firms and their role in the economy. But, in the absence of a
precedent-setting landmark decision, it is not clear that these cases fur-
ther the understanding of antitrust policies. Such case studies are use-
fully complemented by more systematic empirical assessment of larger
samples of cases that allow us to detect central tendencies. Conse-
quently, this paper presents an analysis of federal antitrust policy toward
intellectual property based on results from a comprehensive data set of
antitrust cases.
These patterns should prove useful in reviewing the policies of fed-
eral antitrust agencies. Broadly defined, policies include statements of
3 MORTON HOROWnI-Z, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMwEIcAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 1-30
(1977).
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objectives (such as the Merger Guidelines), decision-making processes,
the allocation of resources, and outcomes. This paper examines out-
comes, which provide insight into bureaucratic performance and objec-
tives, in the form of complaints filed against firms. The first part of the
paper outlines general patterns in antitrust enforcement by the FTC and
the Antitrust Division of the DOJ since 1970. It then describes a sample
of cases brought against manufacturing firms, and compares the attrib-
utes of these "antitrust firms" to firms in the same industry which had not
been investigated. The results from comparison of the two samples form
the basis for an assessment of the factors that influence the likelihood
that firms will be charged with antitrust violations. These issues are dis-
cussed more generally in terms of several cases related to markets for
innovation, research joint ventures, and global competition. Based on
these findings, I compare the performance of the FTC and DOJ and eval-
uate dual antitrust enforcement as a basis for competition policy in the
21st century.
I. AGGREGATE PATTERNS IN FTC AND DOJ
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY
The major antitrust statutes-the Sherman Act, Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, Clayton Act, and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act-have the ba-
sic objective of regulating business and controlling firms which engage
in anticompetitive practices, in order to promote social welfare.4 Federal
antitrust agencies have been criticized for failing to achieve this objec-
tive. A large number of observers would likely agree with Harold Dem-
setz, who found that he could "muster only one cheer" for antitrust
policies in the century after the passage of the Sherman Act.5
Since its founding in 1915, the Federal Trade Commission has at-
tracted attention that ranges from mild tolerance to acidic disapproval.6
The criticism include the allegation that the FTC promotes the interests
of thwarted competitors rather than those of consumers; that it tends to
attend to trivial cases involving small unimportant firms; and that the
agency lacks a coherent vision and fails to contribute to doctrinal ad-
vances in antitrust.7 Critics have tended to be more lenient toward the
4 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1993); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1993); Hart-
Scott Rodino Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1311-1314 (1993); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 41-58 (1993).
5 Harold Demsetz, How Many Cheers for Antitrust's 100 Years?, 30 EcON. INQUIRY
207, 216 (1992).
6 See THOMAS MccRAW, PRoPHETS OF REGULATION 81 (1984) ('The FTC has been a
singularly unsuccessful agency during most of the seventy-odd years since its creation.")
7 See Richard Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. Cm. L. REv. 47, 83 (1969)
("The Trade Commission has acquired a constituency of business groups that includes numer-
ous associations of retail dealers, food brokers, wholesale grocers, auto-parts jobbers, and
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Antitrust Division, which has concentrated its.efforts on the uncontrover-
sial task of prosecuting price fixing violations. According to Posner, "it
is the Division, not the Commission, that has had the greater and on the
whole healthier influence on the evolution of antitrust policy. '' 8 Regard-
less of the accuracy of these statements when they were made, it is un-
clear whether they relate to current antitrust policies.
Decisions by institutions, whether private or public, are not exoge-
nous; rather, decision-making is the product of individuals and units re-
sponding to objective factors, including critical comments by outside
observers. Indeed, it may be argued that the Federal Trade Commission
in 1999 no longer fits its 1969 profile because of those comments and an
(implicit or explicit) instinct of self-preservation. To explore the factors
that influence the litigation behavior of federal antitrust agencies one
might specify the maximization of an objective function subject to statu-
tory and budgetary constraints. At a minimum, antitrust policies may be
described in terms of the nature of the complaints filed, the types of firms
charged, and the impact of these policies on social welfare. This paper
examines general patterns in antitrust charges filed, whether significant
differences exist between the FTC and DOJ in terms of the charges they
bring, and the characteristics of firms involved, including their owner-
ship of intellectual property. The question of the contribution of antitrust
decisions to social welfare is difficult, if not impossible, to answer satis-
factorily. Instead, I consider a more narrow dimension, by discussing
whether antitrust activity has influenced firms' behavior in filing cooper-
ative research and development agreements.
Thirty years ago, Richard Posner reviewed the effectiveness of anti-
trust enforcement, and drew attention to the need for agencies to provide
consistent statistics that could be used for scholarly studies as well as for
rational policymaking.9 Today, the DOJ and the FTC still do not report
antitrust statistics in a form that can be of use for systematic economic
analysis. Instead, these data must be retrieved from the CCH Trade Reg-
ulation Reports. The Reports typically include several entries relating to
one action, some of them listed across several years. The FTC reports
summaries of cases in the "FTC Docket of Complaints" of The Trade
Regulation Reports. The dockets are not very informative, containing
the name of the firm, frequently the good produced, and the charges. I
others. It promotes their interests, as we have seen, with little regard for the larger social
interest in competition and efficiency."); EDWARD F. Cox ET AL.., THE NADER REPORT ON THE
FEDERAL TRADE CONMMSSION 45 (1969) ("Fearful of big corporations, declining in activity,
ineffective in enforcement, the FTC basically allocates its dwindling energies to the prosecu-
tion of the most trivial cases.")
8 Posner, supra note 7, at 51.
9 See Richard Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & EcoN. 365
(1970).
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Figure 1
Private and Federal Antitrust Cases, 1975-1997 (number)
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concatenated these FTC complaints to obtain a list of distinct actions for
each firm. Similarly, I compiled the aggregate DOJ information by indi-
vidual action from 1970 through 1998, categorizing the cases by four-
digit SIC code, and noting the issue, outcome and year of decision when
that could be traced. Once the sample was assembled, I obtained further
information about individual cases from the TRADE library of Lexis/
Nexis. The resulting data set can track broad changes in federal antitrust
litigation and policy over time and industry, although the focus of this
paper is primarily on the relationship between patenting and antitrust
litigation.
Figure 1 shows all antitrust cases, both federal and private, filed in
U.S. district courts between 1975 and 1997. Both series reveal a precipi-
tous drop in total district court filings, but the share of government law-
suits increased somewhat after 1985, partly because of more stringent
requirements that the courts imposed on private litigants. I chose to fo-
cus on federal government litigation in this study because the rationale
for private antitrust litigation is likely to be more difficult to disentangle
and interpret. Moreover, private actions may be related to government
138 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 9:133
charges, as in cases where private plaintiffs use federal complaints as a
signal to free-ride on federal investigation expenditures and to try to ob-
tain damages or injunctive relief from alleged harm that the federal de-
fendant may have caused competitors. 10
Figure 1 also addresses the subject of whether variation in the
number of antitrust cases is related to political administrations. Richard
Posner concluded from an examination of antitrust charges brought be-
tween 1890 and 1970 that the identity of the party in power did not affect
the quantity or quality of antitrust activity. 1 The time series of cases
since that period appears to confirm that in recent years the quantity of
firms charged with antitrust violations does not vary significantly across
different political administrations. However, some researchers have pro-
duced evidence that Congress influences FTC policies, while others con-
tend that "politics plays an important role in antitrust enforcement even
when economic welfare is a more dominant concem."12 The evidence
also leaves open the question of whether the tenets of a particular polit-
ical administration have influenced the nature and quality of recent anti-
trust complaints.
Between 1970 and 1993 the DOJ filed some 1293 charges. 13 The
majority of cases related to allegations of bid-rigging in the construction
industry, with numerous defendants listed in each charge. In keeping
with its stated mission, the DOJ's second priority is the prosecution of
price-related restraints of trade. Almost one half (47 percent) of all non-
bidrigging charges deal with pricing issues, especially the per se illegal
criminal price-fixing cases which tend to be charged and summarily de-
cided in the same year. Given the almost universal disapproval of price-
fixing among economists, regardless of political persuasion, it is hardly
surprising that the DOJ has for the most part avoided the controversies
that surround the FTC. In contrast, during this period the FTC filed
some 1673 consent decrees. 14 These cases predominantly involve false
10 See Thomas E. Kauper and Edward Snyder, Private Antitrust Cases that Follow on
Government Cases, in PRIvATE AwrrRusT LIGATON 329-370 (Lawrence White ed., 1988).
11 See Posner, supra note 9 at 413.
12 Malcolm B. Coate et al., Bureaucracy and Politics in FTC Merger Challenges, 33 J.L.
& EcoN. 463, 482 n.43 (1990). See also Barry Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic
Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Com-
mission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765 (1983).
13 These data are drawn from tables presented in B. Zorina Khan, Calculus of Enforce-
ment: Legal and Economic Issues in Antitrust and Innovation, in ADvANcEs IN THE STUDY OF
ENTREPREmurtsmP, INNOVAAON AND EcONoMuc GROWTH (Gary D. Libecap ed.,1999).
14 Consent decrees were first used in 1906 to record antitrust settlements. A consent
decree is an adjudicated agreement negotiated by the federal authorities and the defendant in
civil antitrust lawsuits. The decree must be accepted by the courts to be in "the public interest"
and is as legally binding as a judgment after a formal lawsuit. The agreement typically carries
no presumption of guilt on the part of the defendant. The majority of federal antitrust cases are
terminated by a consent decree rather than a judgement from a formal trial in court.
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advertising and deceptive business practices, many of which generate
questionable economic benefit relative to the costs incurred. 15 The more
economically based FTC investigations are directed towards mergers,
pricing and restraint of trade actions. In fiscal 1998 both agencies were
involved in record numbers of merger-related enforcement. The FTC
challenged 33 mergers, and issued 23 consent decrees, whereas the DOJ
challenged 51 proposed acquisitions and obtained 11 consent decrees. 16
Over the years, the viability of the FTC has been debated on the
grounds that the work of the two agencies is largely duplicative. Agency
employees contend that this allegation is unfounded and point out that
the FTC and DOJ allocate caseloads through a process of mutual consul-
tation and consent in order to engage in a division of labor by industry. 17
The aggregate data support the division of labor hypothesis, since the
DOJ's cases focus on construction, the service sector, food, chemicals
and the petroleum industries. The FTC historically charged firms in tex-
tiles and financing (such as credit collection companies). However, the
agency has recently increased litigation against firms in software, com-
puters, and high technology, and has sponsored hearings on innovation-
based competition. 18 At the same time, the argument can be made that
differentiation is equally inefficient if, when their jurisdictions overlap,
the two agencies tend to interpret their statutory mandates in an inconsis-
tent and unpredictable manner.
Despite the confused and controversial history of federal antitrust
enforcement in this country, some detect "a need for international anti-
trust standards to help (or to force) developing countries to establish en-
forcement mechanisms" and single out intellectual property because "by
their nature, intellectual property rights raise antitrust concerns."' 19 The
Department of Justice has noticeably directed its attention towards inter-
15 For an amusing and instructive example, see United States v. Laissez Faire, Inc., 99
Civ. 1624 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). The charge alleged that Laissez Faire "failed to possess, prior to
sale, a reasonable basis for all care information disclosed to purchasers on the care label, in
violation of Section 423.6(c) of the Care Labeling Rule.. .one of the care procedures that was
recommended on the care label resulted in dye bleeding or color loss."
16 See FTC and DOJ Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1998; (visited March 20,
2000) <http:lwww.ftc.govlbclhsr/98annrptlhsr98annual.htm>.
17 Personal interviews conducted at the FTC and DOJ, Washington, DC, on October 19
and 20, 1998. Likewise, the ABA report noted that "the United States has shared, not dual,
antitrust enforcement," Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law: Spe-
cial Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission, 19 in 58 ANrrrRUsT L. J.,
53-178 (1989).
18 For information on the FTC Global and Innovation Based Competition Hearings for
1995, see Susan DeSanti, Selected Themes from the FTC's Hearings on Global and Innovation
Based Competition, Address at the 1996 Antitrust Conference on Antitrust Issues in Today's
Economy (March 7, 1996) (transcript available at < www.ftcgovlspeecheslotherl
speech37.htm>) (visited March 20, 2000).
19 Richard H. Marshall, Patents, Antitrust, and the WTO/GATT Using Trips as a Vehicle
for Antitrust Harmonization, 28 LAW & POL'Y INT'L. Bus. 1165, 1165 (1997).
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Figure 2:
Manufacturing Firms involved in Federal Antitrust Cases, 1970-1998
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national antitrust enforcement. The fraction of the DOJ's antitrust cases
that involved global issues increased from below 5 percent to more than
30 percent in recent years.20 The Department of Justice initiated several
investigations involving international firms such as Pilkington PLC. In
U.S. v. MCI Communications Corp,21 the DOJ modified, a joint venture
agreement between MCI and British Telecomm, in an effort to ensure
that the venture did not gain an unfair advantage relative to competitors.
In addition, the DOJ has directed considerable resources to prosecute
criminal violations by international cartels involved in the food additives,
industrial cleaners, and food preservation markets. This effort resulted in
a remarkable increase in revenues from criminal prosecutions. UCAR
International, an American firm, was convicted of participation in an in-
ternational cartel to fix prices in the graphite electrodes market and
charged $110 million, the largest fine ever imposed against a firm for
20 See Joel I. Klein, The Importance of Antitrust Enforcement in the New Economy,
Address before the New York State Bar Association (Jan. 29, 1998) (transcript available at
<www. usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches>) (visited March 21, 2000).
21 No. 941317 (TF-I) (D.D.C, filed June 10, 1994). See Department of Justice materials
(visited March 20, 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/mciOOOO.htm>.
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antitrust violations. In its 1997 fiscal year the Division obtained $207
million from criminal prosecutions (five times higher than the highest
amount previously obtained), followed by an increase to almost $270
million in the next year. During these two years, approximately $440
million was derived from fines paid by defendants in international cartel
cases .
22
Figure 2 shows the distribution over time of a sample of all trade
restraint cases filed by the FTC and DOJ between 1970 and the present.23
This antitrust sample totals 547 cases brought against approximately 500
manufacturing companies, and excludes "noneconomic" antitrust torts
such as deceptive advertising and misleading trade practices. Thus, the
analysis of the manufacturing sample allows us to narrow the focus on
cases that are more likely to involve patent issues. The antitrust roster
tended overwhelmingly to include well-known, high profile corporations
such as General Electric, Dow Chemicals, Raytheon, Ciba Geigy, Eli
Lilly, Monsanto and Borland. The correspondence in the identity of anti-
trust firms with a list of firms that are household names suggests the
possibility that antitrust authorities are pursuing a "big bang" policy,
where limited resources are allocated towards the prosecution of cases
that are most likely to generate attention. Such a policy could be justi-
fied in terms of its likely deterrence effect, but may be questioned on the
grounds that it provides incentives for target firms to overinvest in liabil-
ity avoidance. However, this hypothesis is best examined through candid
interviews with agency officials, since the results reported below do not
provide relevant evidence regarding its validity.
In order to control for industry-specific factors, I matched the anti-
trust sample to firms within the same industry that had not been charged
with antitrust violations. By comparing the characteristics of firms that
had been investigated to those of the matched firms that had escaped
antitrust scrutiny, we can specify the attributes that influence the likeli-
hood that a firm will be charged. These results yield insights into the
decision-making process that informs antitrust enforcement. In particu-
lar, the analysis reveals how antitrust agencies interpret the relationship
between intellectual property and antitrust laws, and whether their prac-
tice differs from stated objectives and guidelines.
22 "The Division now has more than 30 ongoing grand juries-approximately one-third
of our criminal investigations-looking into suspected international cartel activity." Douglas
Melamed, Address before Fordham Corporate Law Institute, New York (October 22, 1998)
(transcript available at <http:llwww.usdoj.gov/atr/publlc/speeches/2043.htm>) (visited March
20, 2000).
23 When there were multiple defendants, the sample selected only the first name men-
tioned in the list of defendants for each charge. The control sample was inspected to ensure
that it did not include any of these other defendants in the case.
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II. PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LITIGATION
The "Schumpeterian hypothesis" is typically characterized as pro-
posing a positive relationship between firm size, industry concentration,
and innovation.24 In the antitrust dimension, this model implies that in-
novative enterprises may attract antitrust attention because they are more
likely to be dominant or large relative to the industry. The concentration
of patenting in large corporations has long been noted and designated the
"monopolization of patent monopolies." 25 Fritz Machlup felt that patent
policies by large firms assured them of "almost unlimited monopoly
power."'26 These statements are based on the view that patents serve to
create and preserve market power through barriers to entry, especially
since patenting around the invention and patent litigation by potential
entrants can be costly and risky strategies. Acs and Audretsch tested a
modification of the usual Schumpeterian model and found that large
firms tended to have a innovative advantage in capital intensive, concen-
trated, and advertising intensive industries, whereas smaller firms had a
comparative advantage in very innovative industries and in more com-
petitive markets.27
Some contend that such research findings highlight the need to
strengthen antitrust laws to deal with large patent portfolios. For in-
stance, it has been suggested that antitrust laws should inhibit firms from
accumulating large stocks of patents through policies such as a progres-
sive tax.28 Others have supported the introduction of requirements such
as compulsory patent licensing or working the patent, under the guise of
antitrust policy, although historically both the courts and the makers of
U.S. patent policies have resisted imposing restrictions on the rights of
the owners of intellectual property.29
Clearly, if firms with more extensive patent portfolios experience a
greater likelihood of antitrust scrutiny, it holds serious implications for
the future of the patent system. Significantly, sanctions under the patent
law are far less stringent than those of antitrust: patentees who are
charged under antitrust law may face treble damages, forced divestitures
and compulsory licensing, compared to the simple invalidation of the
24 For an empirical approach to Schumpeter's model, see F.M. SCHERER, INNOVATION &
GROWTH: Sc-PmETERLAN PERspEcIVEs (1984).
2 See CLAm Wucox, PUBLIC PoLicIEs TowARD BusINEss, 172 (1966).
26 FRiTz MAcHLup, THE POLnTCAL ECONOMY OF MONOPOLY 284 (1952).
27 See Zoltan J. Acs and David B. Audretsch, Innovation and Market Structure, 69 REV.
ECON. & STAT 567, 567 (1987).
28 See CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTrrRUST POLICY 176 (1959).
29 See Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas, 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980) ("[T]he long-
settled view that the essence of a patent grant is the right to exclude others from profiting by
the patented invention."); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. O'Donnell Rubber Products, 84 F. 2d.
383, 386 (1936): ("[mit has long been settled that... it is the privilege of any owner of property
to use or not use it without question of motive.").
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patent grant under patent laws. Thus, if firms perceive that higher pat-
enting is associated with a higher likelihood of antitrust charges, a ra-
tional response would be to reduce the propensity to patent, and to
attempt to appropriate returns outside of the patent system. It should be
noted that this study is not intended to prescribe whether optimal policy
should be directed towards strengthening antitrust enforcement or to-
wards furthering the rights of patent holders. However, legal rules are
unlikely to be wealth-maximizing if they create inconsistent incentives,
so the results bear implications for both federal industrial and intellectual
property policies.
Elsewhere, I reported the results from an empirical assessment of
antitrust litigation initiated by the FTC and the DOJ between 1970 and
1998 against firms in the manufacturing sector.30 This section summa-
rizes the results regarding the patent-antitrust issue, which were obtained
from an examination of more than 500 defendants in antitrust cases, and
a control sample of firms in the same industry that were not charged with
antitrust. It should be noted that the underlying concern is not so much
to ascertain whether there is an inherent or actual patent-antitrust con-
flict. Rather, this study recasts the debate by considering whether inno-
vative firms that engage in high levels of patenting or research and
development antitrust are more likely to be engaged in federal antitrust
litigation. It also discusses whether antitrust policy has influenced firm
behavior, by considering patterns of filing of joint ventures in research
and development, under the National Cooperative Research and Produc-
tion Act which provides limited relief from antitrust sanctions.
In order to examine the relationship between patenting and antitrust,
it is useful to first of all consider the types of firms that engage in patent-
ing. Since there is high variance in the annual numbers of patents issued
to a firm, I use instead the accumulated stock of patents assigned to the
firm in the five years up to and including the year of the antitrust
charge.31 These included patent holdings by firms such as General Elec-
tric (4378 patents between 1977 and 1981), Westinghouse (1923 between
30 These empirical results are reported in Khan, supra note 13, at 12. See also B. Zorina
Khan, Legal Monopoly: Patents and Federal Antitrust Litigation among Manufacturing Firms,
1970-1998, (1999)(NBER Working Paper No. 7068, available at <http://papers.nber.org/pa-
perslW7068>) (visited March 20, 2000).
31 Patents are clearly imperfect indicators of both inventive activity and innovation be-
cause of well known defects such as the fact that many inventions are not patented, variation in
the propensity to patent over time and across industries, fluctuations in the proportion of appli-
cations that are granted, and the high fraction of patents that are useless. However, many
interesting and important findings have been associated with the analysis of patent data, in-
cluding a strong relationship between patenting and productivity. See Zvi Griliches, Patent
Statistics as Economic Indicators, A Survey, 28 J. EcoN. Lrr. 1661-1707 (Dee. 1990) (provid-
ing a comprehensive discussion of the utility of patent statistics in the study of technological
and economic change).
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1981 and 1985), Dow Chemical (1894 between 1983 and 1987), and Al-
liant Techsystems (82 patents, 1990 through 1994). The simple statistics
are consistent with the "Schumpeterian hypothesis," for they indicate
that patenting varies positively with firm size in the antitrust sample as
well as the control sample. Patenting by antitrust firms is significantly
higher across all size categories, both in terms of levels and relative to
total assets and sales. However, antitrust firms tend to be much larger
than the control sample. This reflects the significance of large size (and
hence of market share) in motivating antitrust lawsuits: in some concen-
trated industries (such as automobiles and rubber tires) it was difficult to
find any firms which had existed in the same period and had not been
charged with antitrust violations after 1950.32
The smaller antitrust firms have a greater patenting intensity relative
to total assets and to research and development than the larger antitrust
firms. Both large and medium antitrust firms tend to have higher R&D
and advertising expenditures relative to total assets and sales compared
to the control sample, whereas smaller firms in both samples were more
similar in these dimensions. Medium and small firms also reported simi-
lar physical capital intensity across samples, but the antitrust firms are
characterized by higher levels of intangible assets relative to total assets,
have higher sales growth, and greater profitability. The control firms
tended to have lower excess market valuations (ratios of market value of
the firm to total assets), which may be interpreted as a crude measure
indicating lower market power. The record of higher intellectual prop-
erty litigation for antitrust firms is somewhat ambiguous, since it may
reflect higher valued patents, or greater competitiveness in defending or
enforcing the firm's intellectual property.
The growing contribution of high technology industries to the econ-
omy raises the possibility that the significance of patent/antitrust issues
has increased since 1970. Indeed, over this period there was an increase
in the percent of firms charged with antitrust violations in the chemical,
pharmaceutical, computer and machinery, and professional and scientific
equipment industries-industries which are generally regarded as more
technologically innovative. Figure 3 shows the fraction of antitrust cases
that involved intellectual property either as a primary issue in the case
(for example, allegations of patent-related fraud in standard-setting
brought against Dell Computer), or as a factor in the consent decree
(such as compulsory licensing, or the divestiture of intangible assets). It
is clear that the proportion of cases that involved intellectual property
issues has increased markedly in the 1990s. When this finding is com-
32 In order to indicate how sensitive the results are to differences in size, the analysis
allowed coefficients to vary across firm size. I also tested the robustness of the results by
redoing the analysis after eliminating from the data set the top 100 firms in terms of size.
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Figure 3
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bined with the strong decline over time in the number of manufacturing
cases, it confirms suspicions that intellectual property has featured in a
rapidly growing proportion of cases in recent years. However, we need
to control for other factors that might influence antitrust litigation, such
as profitability, advertising, and size of the firm. Therefore, I used the
firm level data set to estimate the factors that influenced the probability
that a corporation would be involved in antitrust litigation. The major
hypothesis tested was that firms with higher patenting profiles were more
likely to experience antitrust litigation after controlling for other factors
that might influence antitrust scrutiny.33
Official reports by the federal antitrust agencies correctly point out
that firms have rarely been charged directly with antitrust violations
33 The results were obtained using logit regressions that were estimated first across all
firms, then by size of firm. The dependent variable is a binary variable, which has a value of 0
if die firm had not been involved in an antitrust case since 1950 or 1 if the firm had been
charged by federal agencies between 1970 and the present. Coefficients are interpreted as the
effect of a one unit change in the independent variable on the log of the odds of antitrust
litigation.
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based on patent issues. At the same time, a number of landmark restraint
of trade lawsuits that involved technological innovators were being
brought in these years.34 I used information on R&D and patent stocks
to investigate the relationship between innovation and antitrust. Interest-
ingly, research and development expenditures do not affect the likelihood
of an antitrust action being brought against the firm, which suggests that
innovative inputs are not as important as outputs such as patents, perhaps
because the impact on market share of engaging in R&D is negligible or
not discernible. 35
The results for patent assets are strikingly different. Antitrust ruling
regarding patent stocks is quite clear: "Mere accumulation of patents, no
matter how many, is not in and of itself illegal, '36 United Shoe was
found guilty because of its questionable business practices, not because
of its extensive patent holdings. In the absence of anticompetitive behav-
ior, we should therefore find no relationship between patent stocks and
the likelihood of antitrust charges. However, the patent stock coefficient
is consistently positive and significant, and is likewise not sensitive to
outliers, nor to variations in the sample size or time period. When we
control for firm size the magnitude of the patent coefficient falls notice-
ably, but the variable remains statistically significant across all alterna-
tive specifications. 37 This suggests that firms with larger patent stocks
are more likely to be charged with antitrust violations, holding other fac-
tors constant.
The analysis also attempts to account for the influence of intangible
assets and of market power. Capital intensity and accounting measures
of intangible assets were not influential. Advertising expenditures, a
standard proxy for product differentiation and higher market power, are
positively related to the likelihood of antitrust charges. Firms with faster
34 Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Patent Misuse and Antitrust Reform: Blessed be the Tie? 4
HARvARD J. LAW & TECH. 1 (1991) points out that "Significant departures from existing anti-
trust criteria have been required both in the definition of substitutes and the relevant product
market for patented technology," id. at 100, and "A common misconception has been that a
patent or copyright, a high market share, or a unique product that competitors are not able to
offer suffices to demonstrate market power." Id. at 30 n.147. The DOJ Antitrust Guide stated
that patent pools require "particular scrutiny under the antitrust laws," (cited in U.S. v. Motor
Vehicle Manuf. Assoc. of USA, No. 69-75-JWC, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17850, at *1
(C.D.Cal Oct. 28,1982).
35 Although it might seem plausible to use a direct measure of market share, these data
are likely to be of limited use; the data would require information on the share of the firm's
sales in the antitrust market, but most firms operate in several markets and separate data are
not available for the firm's sales in each market.
36 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
37 This result might vary depending on interactions between patenting and firm size, but
inclusion of interaction terms reduces the reliability of the estimates because of collinearity.
Intellectual property litigation was also significantly associated with higher antitrust litigation,
but was excluded from the reported equations because litigation was collinear with the patent
stock.
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growth in sales are also more likely to be the subject of antitrust investi-
gations. Rapid sales growth and excess market value may signal the
presence of market power through innovation or in the form of rents to
firm-specific assets. The results indicate that firms with higher sales
growth and excess market values are more likely to be involved in anti-
trust. The probability is also greater for smaller firms with faster sales
growth or more valuable intangible assets. If it is indeed true that inno-
vative or successful enterprises face a higher likelihood of antitrust litiga-
tion, one might expect that such firms would respond by changing the
rate and direction of their inventive activity. This is a difficult issue to
determine empirically, but some evidence is available in the area of R&D
alliances, an area where innovative businesses seem to perceive and even
overestimate the likelihood of charges or convictions under antitrust
laws.
III. COOPERATIVE R&D AND ANTITRUST
The National Cooperative Research Act (1984) and the National
Cooperative Research and Production Act (NCRPA, 1993) were ap-
proved because policy makers were concerned about the role of antitrust
in the declining competitiveness of American technology relative to for-
eign firms that seemed to benefit from research consortia.38 Commenta-
tors opined that technological innovation would be enhanced if
collaboration in R&D endeavors were freed from the inhibition of possi-
ble antitrust liabilities, and pointed to longstanding Japanese and Euro-
38 See S. REP. NO. 98-427 (1984). The National Cooperative Research Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815 (cited in 15 U.S.C. 4301), related to research and develop-
ment joint ventures. It was later extended to include production joint ventures, National Coop-
erative Production Amendments of 1993, pub. L. No. 103-42, 107 Stat. 117 (1993):
§ 2 COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION: CONGRESSIONAL
STATEMENT OF FINDINGS AND PURPOSE
(a) FINDINGS - The Congress finds that -
(1) technological innovation and its profitable commercialization are critical
components of the ability of the United States to raise the living standards of Ameri-
cans and to compete in world markets.
(2) cooperative arrangements among nonaffiliated businesses in the private sec-
tor are often essential for successful technological innovation; and procompetitive
cooperative innovation arrangements, and so clarification serves a useful purpose in
helping to promote such arrangements; and (3) the antitrust laws have been mistak-
enly perceived to inhibit procompetitive cooperataive innovation arrangements, and
so clarification serves a useful purpose in helping to promote such arrangements.
(b) Purpose - It is the purpose of this Act... to promote innovation, facilitate
trade, and strengthen the competitiveness of the United States in world markets by
clarifying the applicability of the rule of reason standard and establishing a proce-
dure under which businesses may notify the Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission of their cooperative ventures and thereby qualify for a single-damages
limitation on civil antitrust liability."
15 U.S.C. 4301 (1994).
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pean laws which grant such joint ventures antitrust exemptions. Thus,
the NCRPA was "designed to promote research and development, en-
courage innovation, stimulate trade, and make necessary and appropriate
modifications in the operation of the antitrust laws. ''39
The acts clarified the antitrust implications of R&D joint ventures,
and offered relief from costs and fees in unsuccessful antitrust actions.
They also recommended the application of the rule of reason to all joint
ventures, although the incremental benefit of such a provision is arguably
minimal relative to existing policy. Further, joint ventures that filed a
notification with the antitrust agencies were sheltered from the recovery
of treble damages in private and state antitrust lawsuits, because the stat-
ute limited liability in such cases to single damages. These modifications
were apparently motivated by the "overdrawn yet real perception in the
business community that the antitrust laws generally discourage all col-
laborative activity."40
A total of 609 joint ventures were filed with the DOJ between 1985
and 1996. Of these, 124 joint R&D ventures were formed between 1985
and 1988, and some 200 ventures registered between 1988 and 1993.
Approximately 250 cooperative R&D associations registered under the
1993 statute between June 1993 and 1996. The most recent report for
1996 to 1997 indicates that 63 new R&D joint ventures registered over
the period, while 55 existing ventures updated the status of their mem-
bership or activities. Thus the NCRPA has been associated with rapid
growth in the formation of research consortia and/or the propensity to
register these associations formally to obtain lower private antitrust dam-
ages. The responsiveness of innovative firms to a statute that in effect
only offers protection from treble damages seems to suggest an ex-
tremely high perceived probability of charges and conviction incident on
participation in joint ventures. The number of filings with the DOJ is
therefore consistent with the idea that businesses perceive some degree
of conflict between antitrust and innovation. In order to examine this
39 Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, 49 FR 50121, December 26 1984 (emphasis
added). The NCRA of 1984 made two primary provisions:
The first is a simple codification of the consensus view found in existing law that
properly structured joint ventures will be judged under a rule of reason standard..
under the antitrust law.. [Second] parties to a joint venture may disclose the nature
of the venture to the antitrust enforcement agencies and thereby receive reduced
damage exposure from civil suits based on the activities disclosed. Compliance with
the reporting procedures would not result in a "certification" that the venture is legal
under the antitrust laws; thus, even with disclosure, a venture later shown to be
anticompetitive could still be challenged through the traditional dual system of pri-
vate and public enforcement and be subject to single damages.
Committee on the Judiciary, 102 H. Rept. 972, 102d. Congress, October 1992, at 7.
40 See Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, House Rept. 102-972, 102d. Congress,
October 1992, at 7.
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hypothesis more closely, I selected a sample of some 151 firms, compris-
ing 10 percent of the membership in ventures that registered with the
DOJ in five randomly selected years.
European joint ventures tend to be concentrated in the high technol-
ogy areas of chemicals, biotechnology, information technology and new
materials technology. In this country, the Computer and Business Equip-
ment Manufacturers Association had been a strong advocate for the pas-
sage of the NCRPA legislation. It is therefore not surprising that the
sample of joint ventures is dominated by the large number of firms that
participated in research alliances related to the computer industry (both
hardware and software). The majority of these 151 NCRPA firms were
American corporations from the Midwest region (in consortia largely re-
lated to automotive research) and the West, although the DOJ reports
participation by representatives from over 30 foreign countries. A
number of joint ventures included partnerships between universities and
corporations, such as the 1996 "Blue Band II Consortium" to develop
semiconductor laser diodes, which included among its members Hewlett
Packard, Xerox Palo Alto Research Center, SDL Inc, Boston University,
MIT, and the Universities of New Mexico, Texas, and Utah.
It is undoubtedly true that firms collaborate in research for a number
of reasons besides antitrust considerations. For instance, they may bene-
fit from complementarities in knowledge and other inputs, from econo-
mies of scale, the internalization of spillovers, risk sharing and access to
other markets. However, these are reasons for engaging in shared en-
deavors rather than for registration with the federal antitrust agencies. It
is possible to gain some insight into the link between antitrust enforce-
ment and the tendency to register joint R&D activities by considering the
antitrust history of member firms. I therefore analyzed the federal anti-
trust records of the random sample of member firms that filed under the
NCRPA. Almost one third of the sample had been charged with antitrust
violations by either the DOJ or the FTC. Hence, the perception by inno-
vative businesses that collaborations would likely attract antitrust scru-
tiny may not be greatly "overdrawn" given their past experience.
IV. BACK TO THE FUTURE: INNOVATIONS IN FEDERAL
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
The implicit model of administrative behavior in this paper pro-
poses that one of the critical ways in which antitrust agencies influence
social welfare is through the types of cases that they bring. I used infor-
mation on the firm-specific attributes underlying case selection to obtain
information on the objectives of antitrust enforcement. The premise was
that, subject to budgetary constraints and the statutory mandates that in-
form antitrust policy, the agencies allocate resources in a manner that
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reveals the preferences of administrators. It was argued that systematic
analysis can also allow us to assess the extent to which dual enforcement
is associated with consistent choices across agencies, and whether poli-
cies diverge in relation to identifiable characteristics of firms such as
their ownership of intellectual property.
An important aspect of the question of dual enforcement is whether
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission differ in
terms of their strategies. We can use multivariate regression analysis to
estimate the factors that distinguish .the characteristics of firms that were
charged by the FTC relative to the DOJ.41 Overall, the model was able
to correctly predict which agency would bring the charge for 67 percent
of the cases. Firms in the two categories (complaints filed by the DOJ
and by the FTC) did not differ greatly in terms of most of the variables
that were tested. It was impossible to predict at the margin whether the
charge would be brought by the FTC or DOJ based on research and de-
velopment histories, time, advertising intensity, or sales growth. How-
ever, the idea that the Federal Trade Commission focuses its resources on
cases involving trivial small firms seems to be an inaccurate description
of antitrust activity in the manufacturing sector since 1970. Indeed, over
this period, relative to the DOJ the FTC was significantly more likely to
charge larger firms. The Federal Trade Commission was also more
likely to bring cases against firms with higher stocks of intangible assets
in the form of an excess of market value over the replacement cost of
tangible assets-arguably, just those enterprises that are more
innovative.
Over a half of all manufacturing cases in the past three decades
were filed during the 1970s. Some fifty six percent of total cases were
brought by the FTC, which has accounted for a larger fraction of federal
antitrust activity in the 1980s and 1990s, relative to the DOJ. In the
1990s, the FTC has been responsible for almost twice the number of DOJ
complaints against manufacturing firms. One fifth of all challenges by
the two agencies were directed towards allegations of price related viola-
tions such as price fixing and resale price maintenance, but the impor-
tance of pricing violations has fallen markedly. Instead, the vast
majority of federal antitrust cases in the manufacturing sector deals with
mergers and acquisitions. More than three quarters of all manufacturing
charges between 1990 to 1998 have involved challenges to mergers.
41 The dependent variable in the regressions was a categorical variable that assumed the
value of 0 if the charge was brought by the FTC, and 1 if by the DOJ. The independent
variables included patents owned by firms, time, research and development expenditures (cur-
rent and lagged), advertising expenditures, sales growth, total assets, various interaction ef-
fects, and industry dummies.
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Previous criticisms of the FTC's lack of innovativeness in generat-
ing new doctrines appear to be no longer valid. To the contrary, there is
some support for an alternative hypothesis: that the FTC has responded
to its critics by changing the rate and direction of its enforcement activ-
ity. Richard Posner, basing his arguments on cases before 1970, con-
tended that "the FTC role in the enforcement of the merger law has been
secondary."42 In the 1990s we observe a qualitative shift in the orienta-
tion of the Federal Trade Commission, which is supported by the statisti-
cal results. After controlling for the influence of other variables, the
regressions indicate that the FTC was significantly more likely than the
DOJ to challenge recent mergers. Indeed, in every decade since 1970 the
FTC has brought more merger cases than the DOJ, in a period when
merger activity has been increasing in relative and absolute importance.
It has even been suggested that the "Commission is unusually open to, if
not actively seeking, new uses and applications of vertical merger
theory." 43
Figure 3 indicated a marked increase in the number of cases that
involve intellectual property issues. Multivariate regressions indicate
that the FTC was significantly more likely in the 1990s to bring charges
against firms with larger patent stocks, when compared to the DOJ and to
its own past performance. Indeed, the majority of intellectual property-
antitrust cases in recent years has been brought by the FTC. According
to the Director of the FTC's Bureau of Competition:
the forward looking emphasis of high tech industries re-
quires an equally forward looking antitrust policy. Fre-
quently, the focus of competition in these industries is
not over price but innovation of next generation prod-
ucts. Competition in innovation markets must be pro-
tected even where merging parties are not current
competitors, and the Commission has brought a number
of cases in the past few years in order to protect the in-
novation process.44
These findings suggest that the FTC is differentiating itself from the
DOJ by challenging firms in markets that exhibit rapid innovation. This
difference across agencies raises new concerns about the intersection of
intellectual property issues and antitrust policy.
42 Posner, supra note 7, at 50.
43 Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga, Remarks on Antitrust and Intellectual Property in
the Year 2000, La Quinta, CA, (January 24, 1996) (transcript available at <http:llwww.ftc.gov/
speeches/azcuenaga/intelp.htl>) (visited March 20, 2000).
44 William J. Baer, Report from the Bureau of Competition, Address before the Ameri-
can Bar Foundation, Washington, DC, (April 15, 1999).
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A 1957 report to the Committee on the Judiciary found "no basic
incompatibility or irreconcilable conflict between the patent laws and the
antitrust laws," because both have the objective of promoting competi-
tion and enhancing social utility.45 In 1995 the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission jointly issued Guidelines for the Li-
censing of Intellectual Property. According to the Guidelines, "the intel-
lectual property laws and the antitrust laws share the common purpose of
promoting innovation and enhancing consumer welfare. '46 Proponents
of the "no conflict" view specify distinctions between the justifiable ex-
ercise of patent power and unjustifiable misuse that is subject to antitrust
action; countercite other cases upholding patent rights in the context of
antitrust charges; or else point to the lack of supporting evidence. 47
Ward Bowman likewise refuted the notion of a conflict on conceptual
grounds, arguing that the objective of both policies is to increase social
welfare by providing consumers with the most goods at the lowest cost. 48
After more than a century of experience, it is somewhat disingenu-
ous of the antitrust agencies to still promote the politically acceptable
view that a trade-off between innovation and competition does not ex-
ist.49 Not coincidentally perhaps, the Guidelines for the Licensing of In-
tellectual Property have generally not been relevant to the majority of
cases filed by the FTC or DOJ. According to Joel Klein, cross-licenses
comprise a minimal fraction of the 3000 or so Hart-Scott-Rodino filings,
and such licensing practices "have remained largely off our [the DOJ's]
45 Staff Report to Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th
Congress 2d Session (1957), cited in Neil B. Siegel, Patent Monopoly and Sherman Act Mo-
nopolization, 49 J. PATENT OFF. Soc. 68 (1967).
46 See the DOJ and FTC Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property,
reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) P 13,132. The basic declarations of the Guidelines are:
the antitrust agencies will consider intellectual property to be the same as other forms of prop-
erty; it will not be presumed that such property creates market power of the sort deprecated by
antitrust laws; and they will ratify licensing agreements that generate economic benefits and
further consumer welfare.
47 For the "optimists' view," see Willard K. Tom and Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and
Intellectual Property: From Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTTRUST L. J. 167
(1997). A recent decision, Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, 897 F. 2d 1572, 1576
(1990), reflects this view: "the aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may seem, at
first glance, wholly at odds. However, the two bodies of law are actually complementary, as
both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and competition," (cited in Tom and New-
berg, supra, at 88 n.34). Similarly, "there [is no] evidence to support the view that U.S.
antitrust policy stifles innovation by U.S. firms," Shapiro and Willig, in On the Antitrust Treat-
ment of Production Joint Ventures, 4 J. ECON. PERSPECTES 113, 124 (1990).
48 See W. BowmrN, PATENT AND ANrusT LAw 3 (1973).
49 By the middle of the 19th century, the courts recognized that all economic activities
involve trade-offs, including the relationship between innovation and consumer welfare. It is
not coincidental that this period saw a rapid increase in cases at equity which, according to
Justice Joseph Story, required courts to address "the mixed question of public policy and pri-
vate convenience." See B. Zorina Khan, Property Rights and Patent Litigation in Early Nine-
teenth Century America, 55 J. EON. His. 58-97 (1995).
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screen." 50 Similarly, very few antitrust cases involve complaints where
there is clearly a correspondence between the protection of competition
and the promotion of innovation. The proposal of a lack of conflict be-
tween these two objectives is valid for conduct such as patent fraud or
predatory behavior by patentees that featured in fewer than a dozen man-
ufacturing cases over the past thirty years.
For instance, in Pfizer v. FTC,51 it was found that Pfizer and Ameri-
can Cyanamid had deceived the Patent Office and used the patent prop-
erty to engage in monopolization of the tetracycline market. Similarly,
the FTC challenged a 1998 merger between Summit Technologies and
VISX because of patent misuse and patent fraud, and proposed that a key
VISX patent should be overturned.52 Plaintiffs in antitrust disputes can
also bring charges based on "predatory innovation" that has the objective
of eliminating competition.5 3 However, such cases involve clearly unac-
ceptable practices associated with patent ownership, and do not bear on
questions such as whether technological innovators may legitimately
gain market power associated with patent ownership, and thus increase
the likelihood that complaints against them are filed under antitrust laws.
Even within the seemingly "bright lines" of patent fraud and predatory
behavior, antitrust authorities have brought charges that some might
question on the grounds of economic efficiency. 54
Recent administrative decisions illustrate that the "new antitrust"
doctrines toward intellectual property may lack utility. The consent de-
crees suggest several factors that may possibly inform federal antitrust
enforcement policies towards firms in the area of intellectual property:
first, dominant firms may be held to higher standards than less successful
competitors. Second, it signals a tendency to derive strategies from sus-
pect economic models (such as the allegation that firms will leverage
their monopoly power to control adjacent markets) and outdated folk the-
orems (such as the QWERTY myth of path dependence and inefficient
50 Joel Klein, Cross-Licensing and Antitrust Law, Address before the American Intellec-
tual Property Law Association, San Antonio Texas, (May 2, 1997).
51 394 U.S. 920 (1969),
52 Summit Technology, Inc., Dkt. No. 9286, 1998 FTC Lexis 29 (March, 1998).
53 Predatory innovation can include price fixing, prohibitive clauses in licenses, unrea-
sonable royalty terms, restricting competitors, and tying arrangements; there is some question
as to whether it includes stockpiling patents that were purchased from others outside the firm
in order to deter competitors. Janusz Ordover & Robert Willig, An Economic Definition of
Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE L.J. 8 (1981), argue that "even genuine
innovations- new products that in some ways are superior to existing products in the eyes of
both engineers and consumers - are in some circumstances anticompetitive."
54 Since others in this Symposium will analyze the most prominent antitrust case in re-
cent years, the case against Microsoft, I do not intend to duplicate their efforts, except to
suggest that this case arguably has little to inform us about either antitrust law or economics,
and a great deal to tell us about the decision-making process of the antitrust administration.
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lock-in mechanisms.) 55 Third, the antitrust agencies are reversing long-
standing practices that allow intellectual property owners the right to de-
termine how best to exploit their property, and to exclude other firms
from profiting from their efforts.56 Recent cases likewise suggest that,
disguised by the rhetoric of enlightened policy towards intellectual prop-
erty, the federal antitrust agencies are retreating from a trust in the mar-
ket mechanism to their historic and somewhat misplaced confidence in
the ability of administrators to outperform the market.
A growing fraction of cases involve firms jointly charged with anti-
trust violations that are linked to patent based market power and to con-
cems about "innovation markets. '57 Current policies are reminiscent of
decisions from the 1960s, when the courts construed the Federal Trade
Commission Act as authorizing the FTC to restrain firms from violating
the implied intent of the antitrust statutes, even when the alleged viola-
tion had not yet occurred. 58 In practice, the goal of "protecting innova-
tion markets" is a carte blanche that permits antitrust officials to make
arbitrary rulings that are unrelated to economic theories or to market effi-
ciency. This is most clearly shown in the prominent role that patents and
R&D have played in recent mergers under § 7 of the Clayton Act, ad-
ministered by the FTC. The FTC challenged the proposed Roche and
Genentech merger in 1990 and required Roche to license its patents on
therapeutics for growth hormone deficiency to third parties. Similarly, in
1994 the FTC was troubled by the research implications of a merger
between Sensormatic Electronics and the Knogo Corporation, both of
which produce electronic surveillance source labels to protect against
shoplifting. 59 The two firms planned to grant each other royalty free
cross-licenses and to share trade secrets. The FTC claimed that the
agreement would lessen competition in a market that was unlikely to
55 See David Balto and Robert Pitofsky, Assistant Commissioner and Commissioner re-
spectively, Antitrust and High-Tech Industries: The New Challenge, ANTrrRUST BULLrIN,
Sept. 22, 1998, at 583.
56 See Crown Die and Tool Co. v. Nye Tool and Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24 (1923). See
also Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas, 448 U.S. 176 (1980), which refers to the "long-
settled view that the essence of the patent grant is the right to exclude others from profiting by
the patented invention."
57 For example, see In re Imperial Chemical Indus. 116 FFC 1381 (1993), In re Cooper
Indus., 116 FTC 1243 (1993), In re Monsanto Corp., No. C-3457, 1993 FTC Lexis 214, at *1
(Sept. 1, 1993). "An innovation market consists of the research and development directed to
particular new or improved goods or processes, and the close substitutes for that research and
development," according to Richard J. Gilbert, The 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licens-
ing of Intellectual Property, Remarks before the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Washington,
D.C. (April 6, 1995).
58 See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233 (1972); FrC v. Brown Shoe, 384 US
316 (1966). See also FrC v. Motion Picture Advertising Services Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
59 See In re Sensormatic Electronics Corp., No. 941-0126, 1994 FTC Lexis 274, at *1
(Nov. 2, 1994).
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attract entry "because of patent protection for important technology and
the time required to develop the requisite technical skills to compete." 60
Moreover, the merger would serve to "increase the likelihood that firms
in the relevant market will restrict output of research and development
both in the near future and in the long term. '61 The consent decree pro-
hibited Sensormatic from acquiring patents belonging to Knogo, and im-
posed a ten year ban on Sensormatic's purchasing similar patents. The
Sensormatic case treated patented technologies as products, without con-
sidering the increase in net social welfare that might accrue if firms
formed joint ventures for the purpose of sharing knowledge and exper-
tise, and avoiding duplicative efforts.
To students of the economics of technology, the innovation market
model (quite apart from doubts about the ability of a legalistic bureau-
cracy to forecast, anticipate, and "protect" that market) is a curious con-
cept. Even in product markets, where the output is well-defined, the
good is traded, and prices exist, controversy surrounds the appropriate
scope of the market for antitrust purposes. It is all the more difficult to
define an "innovation market," hard to gauge its extent, and impossible
to predict its future course, much less estimate its impact on consumer
welfare. Research and development-is an input whose output is the out-
come of a probabilistic process. According to Zvi Griliches, "much of
the product of research and development is entirely unmeasured and
much of the rest is mismeasured." 62 Significant lags may exist between
R&D expenditures and subsequent results when or if they materialize,
and still more lags accompany the innovation process. Information is a
public good, and each step of the process may be affected and altered by
spillovers from other areas of the economy.
Nevertheless, undeterred by the lack of any formal analysis to sup-
port these decisions, consent decrees in such cases have tended to seri-
ously infringe on the intellectual property rights of firms charged. The
Constitutional clause grants to inventors the "exclusive rights" to their
discoveries, but numerous administrative decisions by the antitrust agen-
cies summarily corrode those rights without judicial review. Many de-
crees require a combination of technology divestitures, compulsory
licensing, and even the forced sharing of trade secrets to ensure that com-
petitors are able to acquire the capability to effectively use the technol-
ogy.63 In Wright Medical Technology, the FTC ordered the firm to
60 Id. at *4.
61 Id. at *5.
62 Zvi GRmLicHs, R&D Am PRODUCTrVrrY: THE ECONOMEIC EVIDENCE, 24 (1998).
63 See In re Imperial Chemical Indus., 116 FTC 1381 (1993) ("ICI shall provide to the
acquirer ... at no cost... such rights to technology, know-how, and technical assistance
regarding PMMA and acrylic sheet process and applications technology as may be necessary
for the acquirer of the properties to be divested to utilize the properties to be divested.") See
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transfer patents, trade secrets and business know-how related to orthope-
dic finger implants to the Mayo Foundation."4 The agency further stipu-
lated that the latter should be able to sublicense these assets in perpetuity,
and that Wright Medical was then required to provide technical assist-
ance to the Mayo sublicensee (a future competitor of Wright). It is diffi-
cult to discern how these decisions can do otherwise than weaken the
incentives for firms to engage in inventive activity. These disincentive
effects have been noted by an FTC Commissioner who dissented in the
consent decree with Dell Computer.65 The FTC alleged in this case that
Dell as a patent holder had abused the standard-setting process. A Dell
employee had participated in the industry standard-setting ballot, without
knowing that Dell owned a patent on the 481 computer bus, which the
company subsequently argued was being infringed by the adopted proto-
col. As part of the consent order, Dell was enjoined from enforcing its
patent. Commissioner Azcuenaga dissented from the order because there
was no evidence of intentional fraud nor of improper gains or usage of
market power. She warned that "the threat that voting on a standard
might result in loss of a company's intellectual property rights may dis-
suade some firms from participating in the standards-setting process in
the first place."'66 In general, analysts and policymakers who propose
remedies such as compulsory licensing demonstrate a failure to under-
stand the full implications of the economic model of induced innovation,
a model that was implicitly supported by the framers of the United States
Constitution.
The appropriate balance between regulation through commissions,
relative to common law litigation over business torts, is not a new ques-
tion.67 As Joseph Schumpeter noted, "rational regulation... turns out to
be an extremely delicate problem which not every government agency,
particularly when in full cry against business, can be trusted to solve."68
also recent cases involving General Motors, Boston Scientific, Ciba Geigy et al., Upjohn Co.,
and Baxter International. A 1995 FTC consent decree related to remedies for alleged abuses in
standard setting by Dell in relation to its 481 patent, without any discussion of Dell's market
power. See In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 FTC 616 (1996). The consent order prohibited
Dell from enforcing its 481 patent for the remainder of its term. See id. Hoechst's merger
with Marion Merrell Dow was only permitted with the proviso that the firm waived the right to
enforce certain of its patents, divested part of its intellectual property, and licensed others. See
In re Hoechst AG, No. 3629, 1996 FTC LEXIS 370, at *1 (Aug. 5, 1996). Courts have
generally supported reasonable royalty fees in such cases, but some monopolization suits do
require defendants to issue royalty free licenses. Moreover, defendants in some consent de-
crees have accepted royalty-free licensing stipulations.
64 See Wright Medical Tech., 119 FTC 344 (1995.)
65 See In re Dell Computer Corp., 121 FrC 616 (1996).
66 Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga, supra note 43.
67 See William Kovacic, Downsizing Antitrust: is it Time to End Dual Federal Enforce-
ment?, 41 Aimrrrrusr BurLLEiN 505 (1996).
68 JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPrrALSM, SocIALIsM AND DEMocRAcY 91 (3Vd ed. 1950).
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Some observers have expressed concern about judicial usurpation of the
FrC's authority, "because the courts have tended to reverse FTC deci-
sions."' 69 However, the majority of antitrust decisions are settled by con-
sent decree, rather than by judicial oversight. In view of the corrosive
effect of recent consent decrees on the ability of firms to appropriate
returns from their investments in inventive activity, it would likely in-
crease social welfare for the courts to review antitrust decrees regarding
patents and intellectual property more extensively.70 The right of patent
and copyright holders to exclude others from using or profiting from
their discoveries is secured by the United States Constitution, and should
not be dismissed or infringed at the whims of administrators. It may be
argued that unlitigated consent decrees involving remedies for concentra-
tion in "innovation markets" in effect deny economic due process to the
owners of intellectual property.
V. CONCLUSION
The American judiciary in the nineteenth century deprecated mo-
nopoly, but celebrated the grant of property rights in patents.71 Judges
did not recognize patents as monopolies, arguing that patentees added to
social welfare through innovations which had never existed before,
whereas monopolists secured to themselves rights that already belong to
the public. 72 The passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 was associated
with a populist emphasis on the need to protect the public from corporate
monopolies, including those based on patent protection. Numerous law-
suits, articles and books since then have debated whether antitrust poli-
cies, which are designed to suppress monopolization, are antithetical to
69 Jeffrey H. Liebling, Judicial Usurpation of the FTC's Authority: a Return to the Rule
of Reason, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 283 (1996).
70 The supporters of the FrC wanted a more predictable source of regulation than the
supposedly ad hoe litigation process. "Thus the business man will have certain knowledge of
the law and will be able to conduct his business easily in conformity therewith." cited in
THOMAS MccRAw, PRoPHETS OF REGULATION 116 (1984). See also Sherman Act debates,
U.S. Senate, 51st Congress, 1st sess., March 21, 1890; Congressional Record, xxi, 2461.
71 See Khan, supra note 49.
72 Courts have stated:
Patentees are not monopolists ... A monopolist is one who, by the exercise of the
sovereign power, takes from the public that which belongs to it, and gives to the
grantee and his assigns an exclusive use. On this ground monopolies are justly odi-
ous ... Under the patent law this can never be done. No exclusive right can be
granted for anything which the patentee has not invented or discovered. If he claim
anything which was before known, his patent is void, so that the law repudiates a
monopoly. The right of the patentee rests entirely on his invention or discovery of
that which is useful, and which was not known before. And the law gives him the
exclusive use of the thing invented or discovered, for a few years, as a compensation
for 'his ingenuity, labor, and expense in producing it.' This, then, in no sense par-
takes of the character of a monopoly.
Allen v. Hunter, 6 McLean 303 (1855), cited in Khan, supra note 49, at 75.
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policies that grant exclusive property rights in inventions. Researchers
who support the hypothesis of a conflict typically describe antitrust law-
suits and identify the large number which seem to hinge on patent issues
or to involve corporations regarded as technological leaders. The roster
ranges from landmark cases in the early decades of the 20th century,
such as those against American Tobacco, John Deere & Co., American
Can and International Harvester, through to the numerous cases since
1970 against prominent innovators such as IBM, Xerox, Eastman Kodak
and, most recently, Intel and Microsoft.73 Some of the studies in this
vein claim that antitrust officials have evinced "almost unbroken hostility
towards patents." 74 Others warn of the possibility of obtaining static (an-
titrust) gains at the expense of dynamic (technological) efficiency. 75
Industrial policy in the United States is shaped by a number of fac-
tors, including federal and state statutes, the courts, private litigation, and
activities by the federal antitrust agencies. This paper focused on the
enforcement of antitrust regulations by the Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission, and was motivated by the marked lack of
empirical attention paid to the issue of patenting in relation to antitrust
actions brought by federal government agencies. In the debate over the
future of institutional oversight of competition policies in this country,
few would predict any dramatic changes in the current organization of
antitrust enforcement. Thus, the efforts of researchers should perhaps be
directed less towards nirvana-like proposals for the optimal structure of
antitrust, and more towards the mundane but necessary task of collecting,
collating, and analyzing relevant data. For instance, it would be useful to
conduct a study that attempted to assess and contrast the consequences of
innovation policies by the FTC and DOJ. I conducted interviews with
officials at both agencies whose comments implied that the FTC is more
likely to bring a charge at the instigation of market rivals (it was argued
that private firms can at times act as surrogate Attorneys General),
whereas the DOJ selects cases that are likely to be economically impor-
tant and precedent setting. The antitrust agencies are advised to allow
greater access to internal records and to promote more extensive cooper-
ation with external reviewers to investigate such matters. For, rational
73 See United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927); United States v.
American Can Co., 256 U.S. 706 (1921); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S.
417 (1920), United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1918). See also BoWtMAN,
supra note 48, at 120-256. More recent cases include the high-profile U.S. v Microsoft, No. 98-
1233, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4014, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 3, 2000), U.S. v. Intel, 3 F. Supp. 2d
1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998), vacated 195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
74 Charles F. Rule, Patent-Antitrust Policy: Looking Back and Ahead, 59 ANTITRUST
L. J 729 (1991).
75 See William J. Baumol and Janusz A. Ordover, Antitrust: Source of Dynamic and
Static Inefficiencies? in Thomas M. JoRDE & DAVID J. TEECE, AN'rrRusT, INNOVATION ANrD
CowETrrrvENFmss 82-97 (1992).
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policies as well as a deeper understanding of the topic are unlikely to be
promoted without systematic analysis.
This article employs an original data set to investigate the nature of
antitrust decision-making in the past three decades. I outlined patterns of
aggregate antitrust activity, which indicated a fall in both private and
government antitrust litigation, but an increase in the relative importance
of government actions. A rough estimate of the frequency of patent/anti-
trust interactions suggested an increase since 1970, which could be due
to the greater economic importance of technology intensive industries, or
to greater government scrutiny of innovative firms. It seemed plausible
that firm-specific effects would explain a greater part of the variation in
antitrust charges than industry effects, so my sample was constructed to
examine within-industry variation.
The major finding of the empirical analysis is that patent stocks are
associated with higher likelihood of antitrust charges for medium and
larger firms. Smaller firms with faster sales growth, possibly an index of
greater success, are also likely to sustain greater antitrust litigation. The
preliminary findings I report on a project on research joint ventures may
also explain the previous reluctance of firms to engage in research alli-
ances because of fears of antitrust charges. The results are consistent
with the hypothesis that innovative, successful enterprises are more
likely to garner antitrust attention, especially since the FTC acquired the
conviction that their mission included protection of competition in the
"market for innovation." However, the results do not fully control for
other elements of firm strategy that might be correlated with patenting
behavior and sales growth. For instance, the evidence on intellectual
property litigation could be taken as an indication that innovative firms
might be more aggressive in their pursuit of market share. Such firms
might also have a greater tendency to engage in anti-competitive
behavior.
Critical reviews and queries about their efficiency and effectiveness
have been directed to antitrust administrators for more than a century.
Antitrust policy has been conducted in an environment that lacks even
basic statistical information regarding the quantity and nature of antitrust
enforcement. I argued that this risks the continuance of institutional my-
opia. When this myopic vision is turned towards rapidly changing tech-
nology markets, regulation by commission risks being inappropriate or
even detrimental to industrial and technological progress. The Constitu-
tional clause grants to inventors the "exclusive rights" to their discover-
ies, but numerous administrative decisions by the antitrust agencies cases
have tended to seriously infringe on the intellectual property rights of
firms charged. Many decrees in recent years have required a combina-
tion of technology divestitures, compulsory licensing, and even the
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forced sharing of trade secrets to ensure that competitors are able to ac-
quire the capability to effectively use the technology. These remedies
deny intellectual property holders economic due process and demonstrate
a failure to understand the full implications of the economic model of
induced innovation, a model that was implicitly supported by the framers
of the United States Constitution. In short, it is clear that the 200 year
old question of the balance between intellectual property and antitrust is
far from moribund; indeed, as we approach the 21st century it seems
very much alive.
